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I. INTRODUCTION 
You made the grades. You took the LSAT.  You accepted an invitation 
to the law school of your choice.  Now, you have to do it all over again.  
This time you need to make the law school grades, in order to be 
invited to join the law firm of your choice.  To make the grade, you 
need to employ the IRAC (Issue, Rule, Application, Conclusion) 
method of case briefing for the next three years of your life. IRAC 
enables readers to easily follow your legal writing.1 
IRAC . . . forms the fundamental building blocks of legal analysis.  It is 
the process by which all lawyers think about any legal problem.  The 
beauty of IRAC is that it allows you to reduce the complexities of the 
law to a simple equation.2 
Sweeping statements like these, extolling the virtues of IRAC,3 are 
all too common on the Internet today.  Novice law students may easily 
conclude that if they master IRAC, a successful legal career is all but 
assured. 
Almost from legal writing’s emergence as a discipline,4 the legal 
writing academy has recognized the limitations of IRAC, and criticisms 
of the paradigm have steadily mounted.5  Yet many legal writing 
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 1. August Jackson, How to Brief a Legal Case in IRAC Style, E-HOW, http://www.ehow.com/ 
how_6523636_brief-legal-case-irac-style.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2015). 
 2. The IRAC Formula, LAWNERDS.COM, http://www.lawnerds.com/guide/irac.html (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2015) (emphasis in original). 
 3. IRAC stands for Issue, Rule, Application, and Conclusion. 
 4. For a history of legal writing as a distinct discipline, see Mary S. Lawrence, The Legal 
Writing Institute the Beginning: Extraordinary Vision, Extraordinary Accomplishment, 11 LEGAL 
WRITING 213, 227 (2005).  The first legal writing conference was held in 1984, and the Legal 
Writing Institute was formally established in 1986.  Id. 
 5. For a detailed review of the criticisms of IRAC, see infra Parts II–IV.  
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professors continue to cling to the IRAC paradigm, often treating it as 
the only path to legal writing success.6 
In this Article, I urge the legal academy to revisit its reliance on 
IRAC as a tool for organizing and writing about legal analysis.  I suggest 
instead a return to the roots of IRAC, using it only to illustrate the basic 
framework for conducting legal analysis, instead of presenting it as a 
template for writing that students should rigidly follow. 
In Part II of the Article, I review the inherent deficiencies of IRAC 
as an organizational paradigm for legal writing, drawing on a wealth of 
literature from the legal writing community and other contingents of the 
legal academy going as far back as 1995.  Then, in Part III, I discuss the 
more recently heard criticisms of IRAC from the rhetoric and storytelling 
perspective.  In Part IV, I discuss practitioners’ growing dissatisfaction 
with the rigid use of IRAC in legal documents.  Finally, in Part V, I 
suggest a fresh view of IRAC that recognizes its value as a basic 
analytical framework but loosens its grip on our students as legal writers. 
II. INHERENT DEFICIENCIES OF IRAC 
The central inherent deficiency of IRAC—one that is almost 
universally recognized—is that it is too simplistic.  “Formulas like IRAC 
and its progeny . . . mask[] the series of complex, interrelated steps that 
students need to learn to analyze and write about legal problems in a 
sophisticated manner.”7  In fact, in a 1995 issue of the Legal Writing 
Institute’s Second Draft devoted to the pros and cons of IRAC,8 
contributors addressed inadequacies in all four components of IRAC. 
                                                          
 6. See, e.g., Terri LeClercq, The Success—And Failure—of IRAC, 50 TEX. B.J. 222, 222 
(1987) (referring to IRAC as “the golden-rule acronym for organizing legal discussions”).  Yet 
LeClercq acknowledged even then that “slavish adherence to IRAC creates reading problems for 
anyone other than a legal historian.”  Id.; see also Jeffrey Metzler, The Importance of IRAC and 
Legal Writing, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 501, 501 (2003) (“IRAC is the key to success on law 
school exams, the bar exam, and a successful career in litigation.”); Gerald Lebovits, Cracking the 
Code to Writing Legal Arguments: From IRAC to CRARC to Combinations in Between, 82 N.Y. ST. 
B. ASS’N J. 64, 64 (2010) (“All legal writers will improve their writing skills and their submitted 
product by using IRAC or one of its many variations.”). 
 7.  Jane Kent Gionfriddo, Dangerous! Our Focus Should Be Analysis, Not Formulas Like 
IRAC, THE SECOND DRAFT (Legal Writing Inst., Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 1995, at 2.   
 8.  See generally The Value of IRAC, THE SECOND DRAFT (Legal Writing Inst., Tacoma, 
Wash.), Nov. 1995, at 1.  The editors of this issue noted at the outset the disagreement among legal 
writing professionals about IRAC:  
 
Just about every comment sees some danger in using IRAC without flexibility.  Beyond 
that the comments divide roughly into two categories: those that see any standard 
structural scheme as potentially truncating or skewing legal analysis and those that 
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A. Inadequacies of IRAC’s Core Components 
1. Issue (I) Component 
With regard to the issue component, one Second Draft contributor 
pointed out that often, before students can formulate the I of an IRAC, 
they must do some preliminary analysis.9  This writer suggested: 
Perhaps we should expand IRAC into something like ‘(QfrFR)+IRAC’ 
in which Q = question, fr = the entire set of possibly relevant facts and 
rules, and FR = relevant fact(s) and rules used to formulate the I of the 
IRAC.  We should emphasize that the terms within the parenthesis—
(QfrFR)—are the necessary preconditions for an IRAC analysis.10 
The I troubled another contributor for a different reason: “Assuming 
that I correctly understand . . . the legal problem solving process, then 
analysis of a question raised by a legal problem should begin with the 
answer to that question.  ‘I’ for issue, however, does not correctly convey 
that idea.”11 
2. Rule (R) Component 
The rule component of IRAC generated more commentary than the 
issue component.  One Second Draft contributor wrote: “I find that the R 
or rule part of this formulation is often unclear to students . . . . [M]any 
want to see ‘rule’ as a general premise only, forgetting that it must also 
include fact specific examples of how that general premise has been 
applied in the past.”12  Her preferred acronym, IGPAC, compensates for 
this deficiency by “dividing the R into two pieces”—the general rule (G) 
                                                          
recognize the value of a standard structure, but may see a need to modify the elements of 
IRAC to a greater or lesser extent.  
 
Id. at 1. 
 9. Dennis R. Honabach, “IRAC” or “(QfrFR) + IRAC,” THE SECOND DRAFT (Legal Writing 
Inst., Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 1995, at 8.  
 10. Id.  Another contributor suggested (F)IRAC, a slightly simpler variation of Honabach’s 
structure, with the F representing the factual background (Honabach’s “preconditions”) that give rise 
to the narrow legal issue.  Sally Ann Perring, In Defense of (F)IRAC, THE SECOND DRAFT (Legal 
Writing Inst., Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 1995, at 12. 
 11. Kim Cauthorn, Keep on “TRRACING,” THE SECOND DRAFT (Legal Writing Inst., Tacoma, 
Wash.), Nov. 1995, at 4.  Cauthorn recommended replacing the I with a T (for Thesis), noting that 
TRRAC “sounds and looks more appealing” than IRAC, thereby “speed[ing] up [students’] 
understanding of it.”  Id. at 5. 
 12. Barbara Blumenfeld, Why IRAC Should Be IGPAC, THE SECOND DRAFT (Legal Writing 
Inst., Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 1995, at 3. 
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and precedent (P)—thus allowing students to “more clearly grasp the 
necessary components of a rule section . . . .”13  “With the IGPAC 
foundation reminding them that ‘rule’ includes precedent that decided 
specific fact situations, students see the ‘rule’ as more than an abstract 
principle.”14 
Another contributor recommended TRRAC as an alternative to 
IRAC.15  She too was troubled by the single R in IRAC: 
The law isn’t always settled and even if it is, it isn’t always 
immediately comprehensible.  Consequently, it’s usually not enough to 
simply identify the rule.  In order for the reader to understand the 
writer’s application of the rule (the “A” in the acronym), the reader also 
must understand the rule.  Therefore, the reader needs an explanation of 
the legal rule. . . . That’s why I put two R’s in my acronym.16 
In a more theoretical criticism, one contributor noted that IRAC 
“encourages students to assume that there is a ‘Rule’ which is clearly 
called forth by the facts so that all they need to do is apply ‘the rule’ to 
get the right result.  However, very often the choice among rules is the 
hardest question presented.”17  Thus, to the extent that professors use 
IRAC rigidly in early legal writing classes, they may be tempted to avoid 
giving students assignments that require them to evaluate competing 
rules—a skill that all lawyers need.18 
A later critic of IRAC, Michael Sinclair, went so far as to argue that 
while the I, A, and C of IRAC are “pretty innocuous,” the R is “seriously 
misguided.”19  He asked, “Are the proponents of IRAC serious about 
there being rules in cases?  If so, what sort of rules could they be?”20  
Sinclair posited that the inclusion of the R in IRAC rests on the 
assumption that “[j]udicial decisions (cases) stand for rules; there are 
rules in opinions, of much the same kind as we find in statute books.”21  
However, “[t]here are indefinitely many ways that a rule may be 
                                                          
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 4.  Blumenfeld acknowledged that like IRAC, IGPAC “has its limitations.”  Id. 
(noting that “[i]f, in an appropriate case, there is a good reason not to use IRAC/IGPAC, then 
[students] should not do so”). 
 15. Cauthorn, supra note 11, at 5. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Thoughts on IRAC, THE SECOND DRAFT (Legal Writing Inst., 
Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 1995, at 17. 
 18. This may be one reason that practicing lawyers are increasingly dissatisfied with the writing 
of new lawyers.  For a fuller discussion of the practical deficiencies of IRAC, see infra Part IV. 
 19. Michael Sinclair, What is the “R” in “IRAC,” 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 87, 87 (2003).   
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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formulated to fit an opinion, and none is more authoritative than 
another.”22 
Moreover, Sinclair noted, even assuming that the ordinary person has 
the skill to look up cases to find the “rules” they announce, “put 
[ordinary persons] on opposite sides of a dispute and they will come up 
with different rules from different cases, and different interpretations of 
the cases they find in common.”23 
Perhaps more problematic, Sinclair noted, is the fact that often, 
lawyers do not extract rules from single cases but from sets of cases.24  In 
fact, rule synthesis is generally among the earliest skills professors 
introduce to novice law students. 
Typically, early in one’s first year at law school, one is introduced to a 
set of cases—the opinions in appellate decisions, a new and formidable 
literary mode—and given a problem, that is, a set of facts and a client.  
My research and writing teacher in my first year of law school told us 
to “synthesize a rule” from the precedent cases.  Such a “rule” is a 
verbal formula that accounts for all of the cases we’d been given.  Then 
we were instructed to use that rule to tell the outcome of the case we 
had been given as a problem.  This has proved successful as a method 
of introducing the mysteries and uncertainties of common law to 
nervous and bewildered One-Ls.25 
Sinclair viewed the process of synthesis as rife with potential pitfalls: 
“There are indefinitely many such ‘rules’ that will fit all the cases in any 
given set of precedents and the present case (which we call ‘reconciling’) 
or that will fit all the precedents and not the present case (which we call 
‘distinguishing’).”26  Sinclair ultimately suggested that the R of IRAC 
should instead be an H for hypothesis, resulting in the acronym IHAC.27 
3. Application (A) Component 
With regard to the A component, several contributors found fault 
with the mechanical use of IRAC, noting that the single A in the acronym 
does not clarify that application often involves both analysis and counter-
                                                          
 22. Id. at 100. 
 23. Id. at 97. 
 24. Id. at 101. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 102 (emphasis added). 
 27. Id. at 128 (“‘[C]ommon lawyers worship at the shrine of the working hypothesis.’” (quoting 
Lord Goff of Chieveley, The Future of the Common Law, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 745, 752 (1997))). 
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analysis and sometimes even policy analysis.28  “The skills of 
synthesizing legal authority, examining alternative lines of analysis, and 
assessing policy must be incorporated into any curriculum teaching legal 
analysis.”29  “To the extent an acronym is helpful,” the writers suggested 
IRAAPC (Issue, Rule, Application, Alternative Analysis, Policy, 
Conclusion).30 
The single A representing Application may stem from the widely-
accepted view that IRAC originated as a representation of the deductive 
syllogism, with the R (rule) representing the major premise and the A 
(application) representing the minor premise.31  “The issue sets the 
operative terms of the premises, and the conclusion is compelled by the 
premises as a matter of logical necessity.”32 
But in a true deductive syllogism, “each major premise must be a 
true statement of absolute certainty, and the minor premise also must be 
a true statement of absolute certainty, so that the conclusion is 
absolutely, unrefutably true.”33  Thus, only in the broadest, most 
theoretical sense does IRAC represent the true deductive syllogism. 
In practice, even the simplest legal writing assignments (and exam 
questions, for that matter) rarely are designed to lead to absolutely, 
unrefutably true conclusions; in fact, many legal writing professors 
intentionally design problems that lend themselves to teaching counter-
analysis34 and that are therefore susceptible to more than one possible 
result.35  Thus, the pure deductive syllogism breaks down almost 
immediately. 
                                                          
 28. Ellen Lewis Rice et al., IRAC, The Law Student’s Friend or Foe: An Informal Perspective, 
THE SECOND DRAFT (Legal Writing Inst., Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 1995, at 13. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Joel R. Cornwell, Legal Writing As a Kind of Philosophy, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1091, 1113 
(1997) (“Translated into Jerome Frank’s model of how legal analysts view decisions, which is 
probably closer, graphically, to what most first-year law students envision, the correspondence 
would be thus: rule (major premise) x facts (minor premise) = result (conclusion).”). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Michael D. Murray, Classical Rhetoric, Explanatory Synthesis, and the TREAT Paradigm 8 
(Univ. of Ill. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 75, 2007), available at http://works.bepress.com/ 
michael_murray/9. 
 34. See LAURA P. GRAHAM & MIRIAM E. FELSENBURG, THE PRE-WRITING HANDBOOK FOR 
LAW STUDENTS: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE 111–13 (2013) [hereinafter PRE-WRITING HANDBOOK] 
(explaining to novice law students the role of counter-analysis in the pre-writing process).  
 35. “Virtually every objective memorandum problem in first-year legal writing courses is 
designed to present the student with some critically ambiguous fact or fact complex to be resolved in 
light of two lines of authority to which analogies must be drawn.”  Cornwell, supra note 31, at 1116.  
This, Cornwell says, is where the “duplicity of the IRAC algorithm” is revealed.  Id. 
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This highlights the inadequacy of the A of IRAC: “The problem is all 
in the minor premise, for this is where ambiguity lies.  How does one 
explain to a student how to fill in the crucial blank” in the application 
segment?36  As Joel Cornwell put it: 
[t]he grafting of rules of law into various hypothetical fact patterns is a 
comparatively tame enterprise if both student and professor maintain 
the fiction that there is a correct application in any given instance and 
that this application is discoverable if enough variables are properly 
accounted in a rational calculus, the form of which, like the form of an 
applied mathematical calculation, is dictated as a matter of logical 
necessity.37 
But legal decision-making is not strictly algorithmic; thus, the rigid 
use of IRAC “is undesirable, first, because it obscures the ethical 
significance of legal decision-making, and, second, because it obscures 
the rhetorical devices that are the very skills touted by the model’s 
formalist adherents.”38 
A better way to think of IRAC, according to Michael Murray, is as a 
model for the enthymeme.39 
In an enthymeme, the major premise, whether it be explicitly stated or 
implied in the enthymeme, must be most probably true.  In other words, 
truth with absolute certainty is not required, only probability of truth.  
Similarly, the minor premise must be most probably true, not 
absolutely, necessarily true.  This produces a conclusion that also is 
most probably true; but this is acceptable because the enthymeme’s 
purpose is to persuade, not to establish or define a proposition as a 
matter of scientific proof.40 
Murray posited that the enthymeme is the better model for legal 
writing, “[g]iven the uncertainties of the law, where legal rules are 
constructed from multiple controlling authorities and, in certain 
instances, colored by persuasive authorities, and where facts might be 
uncertain or subject to multiple credible interpretations.”41 
                                                          
 36. Id. at 1114. 
 37. Id. at 1111. 
 38. Id. at 1134. 
 39. Murray, supra note 33, at 8.  
 40. Id. at 8–9. 
 41. Id. at 9.  According to Murray, Aristotle himself, the father of classical rhetoric, believed 
that the enthymeme “might be the only proper logical structure for a legal argument.”  Id.  But see 
Soma R. Kedia, Redirecting the Scope of First-Year Writing Courses: Toward a New Paradigm of 
Teaching Legal Writing, 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 147, 168–69 (2010) (noting that an enthymeme 
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Whether a given analysis invokes the classical syllogism or the 
enthymeme, novice law students can find themselves at sea if IRAC is 
taught rigidly as an organizational tool.  In her excellent book, Rhetoric 
for Legal Writers,42 Kristin Robbins-Tiscione pointed out that while legal 
syllogisms and enthymemes are deductive, the skills most often required 
to properly apply rules to facts are rule synthesis and reasoning by 
analogy—both types of inductive reasoning.43  Thus, in legal writing, 
IRAC is helpful only when students do not have to synthesize a rule or 
use analogical reasoning.44 
Moreover, “the syllogism is not the only reasoning tool a lawyer can 
or should make use of.”45 
What is particularly unique about legal discourse . . . is that the 
reasoning used manipulates several types of data and knowledge, and 
does not simply employ a linear model of logical thought. . . . [T]he 
process of reasoning through a legal issue incorporates all these 
elements in distinctive ways. 
First, in analyzing an issue that consists of some human need or 
problem, a legal writer must think about what types of legal and 
practical consequences or implications some facts might have. Then, 
the writer must use practical reasoning to make some suppositions 
about the outcomes of the case to advise her client regarding the 
client’s options.46 
Perhaps one of the dissatisfactions with the A of IRAC, then, is that it 
leads novice law students to reason—that is, to apply the law—in terms 
of absolutes (syllogistically), when the uncertainty of the law permits, or 
perhaps requires, at best reasoning in terms of probabilities 
(enthemematically).47  Just as a rigid approach to the R may suggest to 
students that they must find the absolutely correct rule and must 
                                                          
“consists of a sequence of syllogisms, often with a premise assumed,” which often “deceptively 
leads students to feel that ‘logical’ or deductive reasoning will form a complete legal analysis”).  
 42. KRISTEN KONRAD ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF ANALYSIS AND PERSUASION 118 (2009).  
 43. See id. at 111–13. 
 44. See id. at 118 (explaining that legal syllogisms are rarely indisputably true because two 
advocates representing opposing parties “are likely to articulate different, yet reasonable rules of law 
from the same statute, case, or line of cases;” in other words, there is rarely one true “rule”).  
 45. Kedia, supra note 41, at 159–60 (“[L]egal reasoning has other features which do distinguish 
it from the type of classical logical principles a student might have employed in other scholarly 
discourse.  In short, the syllogism is only subservient to a more expansive picture of legal 
reasoning.”). 
 46. Id. at 161. 
 47. Id. at 168–69. 
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articulate it with absolute language, a rigid approach to the A may 
suggest that “the rule” can be mechanically applied to the facts, point by 
point, when in fact, the process of legal analysis is far from mechanical 
and often requires intricate thinking. 
I believe that IRAC works well for beginning legal writers only for 
the very simplest of assignments—the assignment that involves one  
simple, clearly articulated rule from one precedential case and a set of 
facts that either closely matches or dramatically differs from the 
precedential case.48  And this kind of assignment is rare after the first 
week or so of legal writing class; thus, if we teach IRAC at the outset, we 
must immediately begin to backtrack, modify, add caveats, et cetera. 
4. Conclusion (C) Component 
While the conclusion component of IRAC did not engender much 
discussion in the Second Draft issue, later critics of IRAC consider it 
perhaps the most problematic component.  According to Kristen 
Robbins-Tiscione, when working with a syllogism (which IRAC is 
generally understood to represent), “[i]t is often easiest to begin with 
your conclusion and work backwards from there.”49  Yet this is the very 
instinctual approach to legal analysis—jumping to a conclusion and then 
trying to make the analysis “fit”—of which we seek to break our novice 
law students.50 
Donald Kochan has pointed out that a rigid approach to legal writing 
is counter to the attitude of “suspended conclusion.”51  “When one adopts 
an attitude of suspended conclusion, one avoids being conclusory.  One 
embraces doubt, accepts confusion and anxiety, examines alternative 
suggestions, overcomes impatience and habitual tendencies to rush 
                                                          
 48. See Linda H. Edwards, IRAC Format Accomplishes the Limited Purpose it is Designed to 
Achieve, THE SECOND DRAFT (Legal Writing Inst., Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 1995, at 7 (“The format is 
designed to help a novice writer organize the discussion of a single legal issue—that is, a single 
element or condition.  That’s all.”).  
 49. ROBBINS-TISCIONE, supra note 42, at 151. 
 50. See Toni M. Fine, Comments on IRAC, THE SECOND DRAFT (Legal Writing Inst., Tacoma, 
Wash.), Nov. 1995, at 7–8 (“We all know that, if given the opportunity, students will react, rather 
than constructively create methods of analysis or challenge competing approaches. . . . [T]he very 
act of providing a formula reduces dramatically the likelihood that the students will ask themselves 
(and us) the hard questions about why things are done in a certain way; why a particular approach 
works best under a given set of facts and circumstances; what the theory is that underlies any 
systematic approach to legal analysis; etc.”). 
 51. Donald J. Kochan, Thinking Like Thinkers: Is the Art and Discipline of an “Attitude of 
Suspended Conclusion” Lost on Lawyers?, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2011).  John Dewey coined 
the term “suspended conclusion” in his 1910 book, How We Think.  Id. 
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toward an answer, and otherwise avoids the impulsive tendencies toward 
a premature conclusion.”52  This attitude is critical for legal thinking, 
writing, and oral advocacy; indeed, it “replicates the ideal that is sought 
after in a neutral system of justice . . . .”53 
Anecdotally, however, people have difficulty suspending conclusion 
for a number of reasons according to Kochan: (1) because “a state of 
perplexity is disagreeable to many;” (2) because some people tend to 
make snap judgments based on firm opinions that they are not mentally 
energetic enough to question; (3) because some people lack confidence 
in their own intelligence and fear making a final decision based on it; and 
(4) because today’s prevalent “instant gratification” mindset makes it 
difficult to suspend conclusion.54 
The IRAC framework makes it even more difficult for law students 
to suspend conclusion because it overemphasizes the relative importance 
of the C.  Students think that, as one contributor to the 1995 Second 
Draft issue stated, “[i]f the Application section is well focused and 
complete, the Conclusion will follow inevitably.”55 
If this were true, it would be a welcome relief to most law students, 
who “have been educated in environments where there is a right and 
wrong answer” and who “may tend automatically to return to the mindset 
that there must be a ‘correct’ response to the legal question presented.”56  
In fact, our students frequently complain about the ambiguity of how the 
law applies to our fact patterns.57  Students want to arrive at the answer, 
                                                          
 52. Kochan, supra note 51, at 2. 
 53. Id. at 38. 
 54. Id. at 46–49.  This last reason is particularly compelling in light of the well-documented 
characteristics of the current generation of law students (the Millenials).  See, e.g., Joan Catherine 
Bohl, Generations X and Y in Law School: Practical Strategies for Teaching the “MTV/Google” 
Generation, 54 LOY. L. REV. 775, 780 (2008) (“Since internet information appears on one’s 
computer screen with little investment of time or effort, Gen X Y students have developed a 
predominantly passive relationship to information and an expectation of instant gratification.”); see 
also Tracy L. McGaugh, Generation X in Law School: The Dying of the Light or the Dawn of a New 
Day?, 9 LEGAL WRITING 119, 124 (2003) (noting that Generation X students “have come of age in 
an era when information and services can be accessed more and more quickly”).  
 55. Diana Pratt, IRAC: A Useful Beginning, but Hardly a Panacea, THE SECOND DRAFT (Legal 
Writing Inst., Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 1995, at 13.  
 56. Lisa T. McElroy & Christine N. Coughlin, The Other Side of the Story: Using Graphic 
Organizers to Counter the Counter-Analysis Quandary, 39 U. BALT. L. REV. 227, 233 (2010). 
 57. See, e.g., Miriam E. Felsenburg & Laura P. Graham, Beginning Legal Writers in Their Own 
Words: Why the First Weeks of Legal Writing are So Tough and What We Can Do About It, 16 
LEGAL WRITING 223, 255–56 (2010) (reporting survey results showing that many new law students 
felt frustrated because “the law was not as concrete as they thought”).  One survey participant said, 
“I am learning that there are few hard and fast ways to apply the concepts we learn.”  Id. at 256.  
Another said, “[Studying the law] is researching in order to make an educated guess; the law is not 
as definite as I thought it would be.”  Id.  
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in the syllogistic sense—the “absolutely, unrefutably true” conclusion.  
But this is simply not the nature of legal analysis; thus, our assignments 
usually involve scenarios that are susceptible to different avenues of 
analyses and different possible outcomes.  A rigid reliance on IRAC 
places too much emphasis on the C, when the heavy lifting of legal 
analysis and writing is formulating the R and thoroughly and (gasp!) 
creatively working through the A.58 
Another Second Draft contributor neatly captured the problem with 
the C of IRAC: “When IRACian students make up their mind how the 
law applies to facts, they can undervalue opposing views.  IRAC pushes 
students toward answers rather than arguments.  IRAC is sleek and 
efficient; once ‘Issue’ emerges, ‘Conclusion’ ever beckons.”59  Thus, to 
combat this “IRACian” tendency, law students must be continually 
reminded that the outcome of a legal dispute is seldom clear and that 
they must consciously and habitually ponder the rival propositions. 
B. The Confusing Explosion of Variants on IRAC 
In sum, beginning at least as far back as 1995, scholars have 
identified deficiencies with the I, R, A, and C of IRAC.  The result is a 
growing list of alternative acronyms that, while designed to clarify the 
paradigm, may have only resulted in more confusion among law 
students. 
In 2004, Terrill Pollman and Judith M. Stinson conducted a survey of 
legal writing professors to assess the varying terminology used in the 
classroom, and the survey responses revealed a basic uncertainty about 
                                                          
 58. One scholar views this tension as both a strength and a weakness of IRAC: 
 
IRAC conveys a truth that is powerful, profound, and utterly misleading (in the way 
powerful truths usually are). The powerful truth? That law is about rules.  As anyone who 
teaches in the first year knows, that point can escape first year law students.  Watching us 
[professors] twist and turn the rules to our own purposes, puzzling over the mix of 
history, economics, politics and philosophy that works its way into the notes, lectures and 
discussions, students can lose sight of the rules altogether.  IRAC brings them back to 
earth.  Unfortunately, the earth it brings them back to disappears under their feet.  In the 
great first-year “gotcha,” they learn that general rules don’t decide particular cases.  But 
IRAC neatly captures that, too.  There’s a gap between the R and the C.  The rule can’t 
give you the conclusion; the A, the application, has to fill it in.  
 
David J. Jung, I [Heart] IRAC, THE SECOND DRAFT (Legal Writing Inst., Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 
1995, at 10.  
 59. Thomas H. Seymour, Between IRAC and a Hard Place, THE SECOND DRAFT (Legal 
Writing Inst., Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 1995, at 14.  
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what to do with IRAC.60  Pollman and Stinson reported that 67% of the 
legal writing professors who responded to the survey used the acronym 
IRAC, “either alone or in conjunction with other organizational 
terms . . . .”61  However, “[a]lthough participants are highly confident 
that they understand the IRAC acronym, they express low confidence in 
the IRAC variations . . . .”62 
In fact, Pollman and Stinson’s research revealed that legal writing 
professors had become quite creative with the IRAC acronym; “[s]urvey 
participants listed the following acronyms in response to a variety of 
survey questions: FHRO; T/R/RE/RA/C; CRAC; IRLAFARC; 
RREACC; TRAC; FIRAC; TREAC; CRPA; IREAC; RREACC; 
IRAAAC; BaRAC; and C/RAC.”63  However, the survey results 
suggested that “professors are not teaching students the broad vocabulary 
students need to talk about legal writing with those trained by other 
teachers.”64  This may have implications for students long after they 
leave law school, when they will be writing many different kinds of 
documents (not all of which may lend themselves to IRAC) and for many 
different readers (not all of whom may have been taught using IRAC).65 
And today, ten years after Pollman and Stinson’s survey, legal 
writing professionals continue to struggle to arrive at a more satisfactory 
acronym.  In a 2012 article, Tracy Turner recognized that “[a]s legal 
writing scholarship proliferates alternative acronyms . . . lawyers may 
find themselves debating whether IRAC or CRuPAC or CREAC 
represents the ideal structure.”66  Turner recognized that “some scholars 
believe that novice legal writers should be encouraged to develop their 
own organizational structures based on considerations such as audience, 
context, desired outcomes, strategy, story-telling, and problem-
solving,”67 while others “urge a balance between the use of paradigms 
and creative thinking.”68 
                                                          
 60. Terrill Pollman & Judith M. Stinson, IRLAFARC! Surveying the Language of Legal 
Writing, 56 ME. L. REV. 239, 241–42 (2004).   
 61. Id. at 261. 
 62. Id.   
 63. Id. at 262. 
 64. Id. at 242.   
 65. For a discussion of practitioners’ concerns about IRAC, see infra Part IV. 
 66. Tracy Turner, Finding Consensus in Legal Writing Discourse Regarding Organizational 
Structure: A Review and Analysis of the Use of IRAC and Its Progenies, 9 LEGAL COMM. & 
RHETORIC: JALWD 351, 353 (2012). 
 67. Id. at 353–54 (citing many of the contributors in the 1995 publication on IRAC, THE 
SECOND DRAFT (Legal Writing Inst., Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 1995, at 1). 
 68. Id. at 354.   
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Turner based her article on a review of the then-current editions of 
thirty legal writing textbooks published or republished between 2002 and 
201269 and forty-seven articles addressing IRAC and other acronyms.70  
Her review confirmed that “IRAC has been heavily criticized as 
incapable of capturing the nuances of legal analysis.”71  Turner 
recommended that instead of using IRAC rigidly, legal writing 
professors should focus on the four “core principles” of effective 
organization that legal writing texts and articles seemed to agree upon: 
(1) the need for rule-centered analysis; (2) the need for separating the 
analysis of discrete issues; (3) the need for synthesizing legal principles 
pulled from multiple sources; and (4) the need for a unified document, 
with roadmaps and transitions to tie the components of the analysis 
together.72  When these four principles are emphasized in the legal 
writing classroom, students can effectively organize and communicate 
legal analysis without relying on a paradigm like IRAC or its 
variations.73 
C. Rhetorical Deficiencies of IRAC 
More recently, IRAC has come under scrutiny from a relatively new 
contingency of the legal academy—the proponents of the “legal 
storytelling” approach to legal writing.74  Recognizing that legal 
reasoning and legal arguments often rest on probabilities and not 
certainties,75 these scholars and professors advocate a model of legal 
writing, especially persuasive legal writing, that emphasizes the 
                                                          
 69. Id.  Turner’s review was subject to the availability of the texts in her law school library or 
on her bookshelves.  Id.  Twenty-five of the books addressed the use of acronyms as organizational 
paradigms.  See id. at 354–55. 
 70. Id. at 355.  Turner expounded on the meaning of some of the acronyms Pollman and Stinson 
had catalogued and added some new ones, including IREXAC (Issue, Rule, Explanation, 
Application, Conclusion) and RAFADC (Rule, Authorities, Facts (of the problem case), Analogizing 
and Distinguishing, Conclusion).  Id. at 357–58. 
 71. Id. at 356.   
 72. Id. at 355–63. 
 73. Id. at 364. 
 74. For a recent treatment of the legal storytelling movement, see Stephen Paskey, The Law is 
Made of Stories: Erasing the False Dichotomy Between Stories and Legal Rules, 11 LEGAL COMM. 
& RHETORIC: JALWD 51, 54–59 (2014) (describing three storytelling movements, the third of 
which originated with legal writing faculty and focuses on “the use of stories in legal pedagogy and 
practice”). 
 75. Murray, supra note 33, at 17–18. 
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importance of the three pillars of classical rhetoric—logos, ethos, and 
pathos—in effective legal writing.76 
More than fifteen years ago, Joel Cornwell observed that the nature 
of language “precludes any algorithmic formula for ethical decision-
making.”77  Thus, “the IRAC model is undesirable, particularly if steps 
are not taken to demonstrate to the student that it is a model of 
conversational rhetoric as opposed to a model of logical calculus.”78  Put 
another way, IRAC is a “clip-clop formula [that] allows students to 
traverse the legal landscape in a methodical manner” but that is “not 
structured to appeal to the reader’s innate ‘understanding’” of the 
narrative of a situation.79 
Consistent with these views, the legal storytelling movement has 
gained traction in recent years as an alternative way of thinking about 
legal writing.  Proponents of legal storytelling echo Cornwell’s criticism 
of IRAC: “The paradigm is, of course, a very useful tool for constructing 
a legal proof, and it is welcome relief for struggling first-year students 
because it feels like an ‘answer’ in a year of study that is otherwise 
nothing but questions.”80  But they strongly assert IRAC’s inadequacy: 
“The problem with IRAC . . . is that it doesn’t have much room for 
people.”81 
 Think about this.  “I” refers to the legal issue under consideration.  
No people in there.  The same goes for “R,” the rule, which refers to 
the legal concepts and theories that will guide the court in reaching a 
decision.  “A” has a bit of promise, if you take “A” to mean 
application, but even then, people are just objects upon which the rule 
operates.  And if you take “A” to mean analysis, that is just more 
processing of the legal rule.  The “C,” or conclusion, is then just the 
legal conclusion that flows logically from the previous pieces. 
Law, law, law.  Where did all the people go in this process?82 
                                                          
 76. See generally id. (discussing the audience’s perception of the advocate’s ethos); Kenneth D. 
Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 LEGAL WRITING 127 (2008); Bret 
Rappaport, Tapping the Human Adaptive Origins of Storytelling by Requiring Legal Writing 
Students to Read a Novel in Order to Appreciate How Character, Setting, Plot, Theme, and Tone 
(CSPTT) Are as Important as IRAC, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 267 (2008).   
 77. See Cornwell, supra note 31, at 1092. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Rappaport, supra note 76, at 272. 
 80. See Chestek, supra note 76, at 129. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 129–30. 
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In the applied storytelling realm, IRAC is viewed simply as one 
possible method of constructing small pieces of the larger puzzle that is 
an appellate brief—as “merely one type of material that a writer can use 
to construct a solid brief.”83  The central elements of storytelling—
setting, conflict, character, point of view, theme, and plot—form the 
toolkit of the brief writer.84  And IRAC may or may not be compatible 
with these elements. 
For example, Kenneth Chestek has noted that when a brief is not 
attentive to the element of character, it misses the opportunity to 
persuade the reader through pathos—that is, through identification with 
the client and sympathy for the client’s position.85  But IRAC, which 
focuses “primarily on rule-based reasoning to the exclusion of other 
forms of reasoning,” leaves little room for character development.86  
Thus, to the extent we emphasize IRAC as a rigid organizational tool, we 
may inhibit the development of our students’ ability to move beyond the 
legal rules to the “heart” of a case when they seek to communicate an 
analysis to a legal reader. 
III. PEDAGOGICAL DEFICIENCIES OF IRAC 
In light of all of these criticisms, why does IRAC remain the chief 
pedagogical tool for teaching legal writing?  One scholar has suggested 
that IRAC “dominates the pedagogical landscape . . . because there are 
not many alternatives from which to choose” given legal writing’s fairly 
recent emergence as part of the law school curriculum.87  But in today’s 
legal education landscape, where more is known than ever before about 
how novice law students learn, there are compelling pedagogical reasons 
to revisit how and when IRAC is presented in the first year of law 
school. 
A. The Complex Subsidiary Skills Required for IRAC 
Aside from IRAC’s inherent deficiencies, it is problematic for 1Ls 
because using IRAC effectively requires new law students to tap into a 
number of subsidiary skills that, for many, may still be poorly 
                                                          
 83. Id. at 132.  
 84. Id. at 137. 
 85. Id. at 143–44. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Kedia, supra note 41, at 164–65. 
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developed.88  In 2009, on the heels of the Carnegie Report, Nelson P. 
Miller and Bradley J. Charles undertook to catalogue these subsidiary 
skills to support their recommendation that “law schools must make plain 
how and what it is that students are required to learn.”89 
Miller and Charles recognized IRAC as “the generally accepted way 
of representing legal analysis” and “assume[d] that students should use 
it.”90  Nonetheless, in the next breath, they called IRAC “oversimplified” 
and then proceeded for the remainder of the article to identify and 
explain no fewer than sixteen subsidiary skills students must “master” to 
effectively use IRAC.91 
The first category of skills, labeled preparatory skills, includes 
thinking and reading.92  In this context, thinking refers to the “practices 
that promote effective thinking,” including mental energy, concentration, 
memory, sensory integration, organization, and “other mental states.”93  
Reading includes the use of such strategies as “readiness, purpose, 
rereading, anchoring, evaluating, and hypothesizing” (as opposed to 
“only linear reading strategies like highlighting, paraphrasing, noting 
detail, and making margin notes”).94 
How does this analytic reading strategy relate to the IRAC framework?  
First, students must read to know the rule—the R of IRAC.  Second, 
reading will help the student develop legal application skills—the A of 
IRAC.  And, lastly, students will gain practice with IRAC and its 
subsidiary skills every time they read a case because each case follows 
the IRAC format.95 
But each of these relationships between reading and IRAC is suspect.  
First, legal educators are keenly aware of the time and effort it takes for 
                                                          
 88. Nelson P. Miller & Bradley J. Charles, Meeting the Carnegie Report’s Challenge to Make 
Legal Analysis Explicit—Subsidiary Skills to the IRAC Framework, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 192, 193 
(2009).   
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.   
 91. Id. at 193–94.  As I have discussed in previous articles, I do not view the law, or legal 
writing, as a “mastery subject.”  See Miriam E. Felsenburg & Laura P. Graham, A Better Beginning: 
Why and How to Help Novice Legal Writers Build a Solid Foundation By Shifting Their Focus From 
Product to Process, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 83, 90 (2012) [hereinafter Better Beginning] 
(encouraging law professors to deliberately teach students that “they will never learn all of the law or 
master it” (emphasis added)). 
 92. Miller & Charles, supra note 88, at 194–96. 
 93. Id. at 194–95. 
 94. Id. at 196. 
 95. Id. (emphasis added).   
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novice law students to learn to read cases and other authorities efficiently 
and effectively.96  Professor Ruth Ann McKinney has noted: 
Take time to read with your students—carefully, closely, attentively—
and you may find many who are reading inefficiently (if dutifully) and 
ineffectively, identifying the wrong purpose for their reading and 
taking a remarkable amount of time without engaging in a meaningful 
way with the text.  Other students, frustrated with their own 
inefficiency or inability to draw meaning from their reading, take 
shortcuts (becoming over-dependent, for example, on study aids or 
computer-based highlighted text) or give up on reading altogether.97 
Second, to say that students must be able to “read to know the rule—
the R of IRAC”—takes us back to Professor Sinclair’s objections about 
the indeterminate nature of common law rules.98  Many seasoned lawyers 
still struggle with articulating the rule of any given case or group of 
cases; how much greater the struggle is for novice law students! 
Third, the statement that “each case follows the IRAC format” is 
simply false, at least in light of the way most law professors present 
IRAC.99  In fact, very few opinions follow the IRAC “formula,” if that is 
understood to mean that they begin by stating the issue, continue by 
announcing the rule, and then proceed to clearly apply that rule to the 
facts of the case.100 
Thus, while I agree that analytic reading is an essential preliminary 
skill to sound legal analysis, I disagree with the supposition that novice 
law students have the requisite analytic reading skills to smoothly 
transition into the world of IRAC, which they are often forced to enter on 
Day One of legal writing class. 
The second category of subsidiary skills Miller and Charles 
identified is conceptual skills.101  In this category are conceptualizing,102 
                                                          
 96. See, e.g., RUTH ANN MCKINNEY, TEACHER’S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY READING LIKE A 
LAWYER TIME SAVING STRATEGIES FOR READING LAW LIKE AN EXPERT 5 (2d ed. 2013) (noting 
that as a result of changes in early public education, students “read far less today than did their peers 
of ten or twenty years ago”); see also Better Beginning, supra note 91, at 99–103 (recognizing that 
close, active reading is a key component of the pre-writing process and detailing methods that 
beginning law students should employ when reading and assessing legal authorities).  
 97. MCKINNEY, supra note 96, at 6.  
 98. See generally Sinclair, supra note 19. 
 99. Miller & Charles, supra note 88, at 196.  
 100. See Benfield, supra note 17, at 17 (noting that “very few opinions by good (or bad—but 
more often bad) judges use an IRAC-type system.”); see also John Leubsdorf, The Structure of 
Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447, 451 (2001) (“The judicial opinion, despite its familiarity 
and the dullness of many of its exemplars, turns out to be an unexpectedly complicated and subtle 
genre, comparable in these respects to more traditional literary genres.”). 
 101. Miller & Charles, supra note 88, at 194. 
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reasoning,103 generalizing,104 specifying,105 and hypothesizing.106  Again, 
very early in the first semester, law students certainly have not 
“mastered” these skills and, in fact, may not have ever been taught to 
consciously employ them.  These are skills that most law students 
develop over a long time and with much practice. 
The third category of subsidiary skills Miller and Charles identified 
is logical skills:107 deducing,108 inducing,109 and abducing.110  Miller and 
Charles posited that deductive reasoning is the most familiar of these 
three skills, because it follows the classic syllogism that starts with a 
major premise, followed by a minor premise, followed by a 
conclusion.111  Miller and Charles enthused, “This syllogism is centuries 
old; so it’s no wonder that IRAC, which mirrors this syllogism, makes so 
much sense!”112 
However, as Miller and Charles then noted, deductive reasoning 
“may appear to be mechanical but . . . can involve such an array of 
different mental activities in different settings that it probably involves as 
                                                          
 102. Id. at 199–202.  The “ability to acquire, recall, and use” appropriate concepts is what makes 
lawyers “expert at legal analysis.”  Id. at 200.  Important aspects of conceptualizing include “word 
recognition” (recalling and using the right words, as symbols for larger meaning), assembling 
schema for the structure of connected concepts, and “cognitive map[ping]” (creating “mental 
picture[s] or outline[s] connecting schemas to other schemas”).  Id. at 200–01. 
 103. Id. at 202–04.  Unreasoned thinking occurs when law students “think and decide primarily 
on the basis of [cause-and-effect] and personal preference or influence.”  Id. at 203.  Reasoned 
thinking considers a statement’s content rather than its cause or author, examining “different possible 
goals, purposes, policies, interests, and meanings.”  Id. 
 104. Id. at 204–05.  Generalizing involves “synthesiz[ing] rules and holdings to state more 
general rules of law before applying those rules to other specific cases.”  Id. at 204.  The skill of 
generalizing is “one way to create the R of IRAC.”  Id. at 205.  Students also need to evaluate what 
is and is not a fair generalization.  Id.  
 105. Id. at 205–06.  “Students must develop the skill of determining whether and how to make a 
rule more specific to a certain situation or application.”  Id. at 205. 
 106. Id. at 206–07.  Miller and Charles apparently relate this skill to the A of IRAC:  
 
When events have already occurred and the facts about them are well known, lawyers 
will often hypothesize other facts to fully appreciate the . . . known facts.  Generating 
hypothetical scenarios to compare and contrast other situations helps lawyers holistically 
judge the matter at hand.  It is a form of inductive reasoning that constructs picture-
stories as metaphorical imagery, similar to reasoning by analogy.   
 
Id. at 207. 
 107. Id. at 208. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 209. 
 110. Id. at 210. 
 111. Id. at 208.  For a discussion of IRAC as it relates to classical rhetoric, see supra Part II.C. 
 112. Id. 
2015] WHY-RAC? 699 
much art as science.”113  They also recognized that inductive reasoning 
(most commonly accomplished through analogy), and not the more 
familiar deductive reasoning, is often the bread and butter of highly 
skilled trial lawyers, who often rely on storytelling to lead the court to 
the desired outcome.114  And as for abductive reasoning, how many long-
time lawyers, much less novice law students, can define that term?115  In 
fact, I fear that even the word “syllogism” means nothing to a large 
percentage of today’s 1Ls.  Thus, to say that IRAC simply mirrors the 
classic logical syllogism does nothing to advance most students’ ability 
to use IRAC effectively. 
As if these three categories of subsidiary skills were not enough, 
there is yet a fourth: evaluating skills.116  These consist of evaluating,117 
contrasting,118 scaling,119 satisfying,120 weighing,121 and quantifying.122 
                                                          
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. at 207–08. 
 115. “To abduce is to infer that something may exist from the existence of other matters that are 
sometimes connected with the matter inferred. . . . Abductive reasoning is not, strictly speaking, a 
form of logic and can produce errors.”  Id. at 210.  Miller and Charles did not explain how the skill 
of abductive reasoning relates to IRAC other than to state that it is “an evaluative aid toward finding 
an answer or solution,” presumably by allowing lawyers to draw reasonable inferences that will lead 
to further fact-finding.  Id.   
 116. Id. at 211–18. 
 117. Id. at 211–14.  Students must learn to “evaluat[e] arguments to determine the logical fitness 
of an assertion or premise.  Evaluation has to do with making sound judgments, which of course is 
necessary to give sound legal advice.”  Id. at 211.  And the skill of evaluation itself has five 
subsidiary skills: “identifying the assertion, argument, or premise” to be evaluated, questioning it, 
judging what evidence is relevant, deciding whether that evidence is consistent with the premise and 
sufficient to establish it in the mind of a reasonable person, and identifying the implications of 
possible outcomes.  Id. at 211–14 (emphasis added). 
 118. Id. at 214–15.  Contrasting involves usefully comparing the hypothetical scenarios 
generated through the skill of hypothesizing with the facts of the case at hand (“the nuts and bolts of 
reasoning by analogy”).  Id. at 214.   
 119. Id. at 215–16.  Scaling allows students to contrast hypothetical scenarios by placing them 
“along a spectrum or continuum from exaggerated contrasting points at either end.”  Id. at 215.   
 120. Id. at 216–17.  Miller and Charles note that often it is uncertain whether an element is 
satisfied: “Although ‘satisfying’ an ‘element’ may sound scientific, a lawyer need not conclude with 
certainty.  The art of being a lawyer is often in reaching appropriately qualified conclusions as to 
whether an element has been satisfied.”  Id. at 217. 
 121. Id. at 217–18.  Weighing is the skill needed when a legal test has factors rather than 
elements; students must first develop a list of factors; next, align the case facts with the factors to 
which they relate; and finally, conclude which side each factor favors.  Id. at 217.  As we studied the 
role of pre-writing in first-year legal writing courses, Professor Felsenburg and I discovered that 
each of these three steps in the weighing process is immensely challenging for new law students, 
even in the simplest scenario.  Our Pre-Writing Handbook devotes an entire chapter to identifying 
relevant factors, constructing a visual to represent the factors, and then inserting case facts into the 
visual; it then devotes another entire chapter to evaluating the strength of each factor and reaching a 
reasonable conclusion.  See PRE-WRITING HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 89–115.   
700 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
Of course, legal educators recognize the value of these skills and 
actively seek to help their students develop them.  But I disagree that 
teaching these subsidiary skills will promote “[e]arly mastery of 
learning” among law students.123  Simply put, legal analysis is not a 
mastery subject.  Certainly in the very early part of the 1L year, when 
many legal writing professors introduce IRAC, very few students possess 
the subsidiary skills that Miller and Charles considered necessary to use 
the formula effectively. 
B. Novice Students’ Lack of Schemata for Constructing Knowledge 
Many legal writing texts purport to teach students how to master 
legal writing—or, put another way, how to be “expert” legal writers.124  
But I am convinced that the most that can be expected of 1Ls is that by 
the end of the year they will be “competent novices” at legal writing.125 
Susan Provenzano and Leslie Kagan have summarized well the 
differences between expert legal writers and novice legal writers: 
[E]xpert legal writers adopt specific rhetorical strategies for producing 
well-organized, precise, and deep legal analysis. They use reflective 
writing techniques and approach the writing process recursively, 
moving from global to local concerns and back, and from parts to 
wholes and back.  Expert legal writers are also able to step back from 
their writing and imagine audience needs and responses.  The expert’s 
written product is thus reader-centered, with a clear focus on the 
document’s communicative purpose.  Novice legal writers, on the other 
hand, tend to view the writing process as linear, cannot remove 
themselves from their writing, and concentrate on telling what they 
know irrespective of their audience’s needs.  The result is a 
“knowledge-telling” document that memorializes the writer’s thought 
processes but is not of great use to the reader.126 
                                                          
 122. Miller & Charles, supra note 88, at 218–19.  Quantifying involves being able to clearly 
understand and communicate the level of certainty of legal conclusions, which, as Miller and Charles 
recognize, “involves not only judgment but experience.”  Id. at 219.   
 123. Id. 
 124. See, e.g., NANCY L. SCHULTZ & LOUIS J. SIRICO, JR., LEGAL WRITING AND OTHER 
LAWYERING SKILLS 1 (5th ed. 2010) (stating that students will “master an approach that emphasizes 
precision, good organization, and plain English”); JOHN C. DERNBACH ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
TO LEGAL WRITING & LEGAL METHOD xxv (5th ed. 2013) (“With time and practice, the finer points 
of legal writing and legal method can be mastered.”). 
 125. See Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law Students to Be Self-Regulated Learners, 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 447, 449 (2003) (suggesting that even by the end of three years of law school, our 
students are, at most, “competent novice lawyers”); see also Better Beginning, supra note 91, at 92. 
 126. Susan E. Provenzano & Lesley S. Kagan, Teaching in Reverse: A Positive Approach to 
Analytical Errors in 1L Writing, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 123, 162 (2007). 
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Given these differences, IRAC as an organizational formula is an 
ineffective vehicle for moving students from novice even to competent 
novice, much less for moving them from novice to expert. 
As newcomers to the “discourse community” of the law,127 1Ls have 
an immediate need to develop “domain-specific schemata”128 for learning 
within that community.  This includes substantive schemata—contexts 
for learning substantive doctrines and concepts—and, perhaps more 
relevant in the legal writing classroom, a syntactical schema.129  A 
syntactical schema comprises an understanding of “components of the 
legal system [and] the interrelationship of the various components,” as 
well as “the conventions of the discourse and . . . the function and 
interrelationship of the basic units contained in the structure of the 
discourse.”130 
Of course, IRAC is one such syntactical schema—it describes the 
units of discourse within the legal profession.131  Thus, it makes sense to 
introduce IRAC as a framework for legal analysis very early on—
perhaps on Day One of the first semester.  And it might make sense to 
base students’ first writing assignment on IRAC—but this assignment 
should be very narrowly tailored and simple: one clear issue, one clear 
rule, one straightforward factual application, and one fairly easy 
conclusion.132  And the evaluation of this assignment should not be 
related to students’ written product, but to their analytical process.133 
Paula Lustbader, in an important article on the cognitive learning 
process of law students,134 analogized this learning process to the process 
                                                          
 127. See Nancy Soonpaa, Using Composition Theory and Scholarship to Teach Legal Writing 
More Effectively, 3 LEGAL WRITING 81, 87 (1997) (“Only when writers understand a new discourse 
community, such as the academic or professional discourse community, can they set operational 
goals that will allow them to meet the conventions of that new kind of writing.”). 
 128. See Paula Lustbader, Construction Sites, Building Types, and Bridging Gaps: A Cognitive 
Theory of the Learning Progression of Law Students, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 315, 327 (1997) 
(“Without such schemata, a novice, who may understand the specifics of a substantive area, will be 
unable to use her knowledge effectively because she will not know the structure of the discourse, the 
order in which to present ideas, when to emphasize different concepts, and what information she 
needs to make explicit versus what information is understood implicitly.”).   
 129. See id. at 334. 
 130. Id. at 334.   
 131. Id.  Lustbader used the acronym (P)IRAC, including policy as a fundamental component of 
legal discourse.  Id.   
 132. See Edwards, supra note 48, at 7 (noting that IRAC works well only for the simplest 
analysis). 
 133. See generally Felsenburg & Graham, supra note 91 (suggesting strategies for facilitating 
students’ readiness and responsiveness to learning the process of legal analysis, including setting 
clear and reasonable non-mastery goals, emphasizing metacognitive skills, and incorporating pre-
writing into the first-year legal writing classroom). 
 134. See generally Lustbader, supra note 128. 
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of constructing a house.  Lustbader posited that beginning law students 
begin at the preconstruction site and from there must bridge the gap to 
technician.135  “The gap between Preconstruction and Technician is the 
transition students make from being nonlaw students to law students.”136  
I believe that IRAC’s function in legal writing pedagogy should be 
primarily to bridge this gap. 
Lustbader asserted that when students have bridged the gap from 
Preconstruction to Technician, they have “beg[u]n to learn basic 
syntactical and substantive schemata” of the legal discourse 
community.137  Technicians can “mechanically apply basic concepts and 
methods to familiar problems.  However, they cannot transfer their 
understanding to a problem that has slight variations from previous ones 
because they have not developed the underlying principles or schemata 
sufficiently.”138  Thus, while technicians can “adhere strictly to the 
(P)IRAC structure in articulating their analysis,” this adherence “often 
creates a form-over-substance problem.”139 
Interestingly, the next stage in Lustbader’s construction process is 
Drafter.140  The tasks she described in the Drafter stage sound 
suspiciously like the tasks we often expect our students to perform after 
just a few weeks of legal writing instruction.  Noting that “[t]he 
transition from Technician to Drafter is difficult,” Lustbader suggested 
that “[w]hereas in the Technician site it was enough for students to apply 
a schema by rote, as Drafters they must learn to transfer their knowledge 
to new situations and understand why they would apply the doctrine or 
policy.”141 
It is at this stage that I think rigid insistence on IRAC as the 
organizational tool for writing is most dangerous.142  We should not be 
                                                          
 135. Id. at 330. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 331. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 332. 
 140. Id. at 340. 
 141. Id.; see Fine, supra note 50, at 7–8 (observing that “if given the opportunity, students will 
react, rather than constructively create methods of analysis or challenge competing approaches.  
Giving students a convention within which to operate frustrates our efforts to develop in students an 
understanding of the process of legal analysis by deconstructing the various steps, and then 
structuring an analytic framework appropriate to a given task.”).  
 142. I do think there is room for talking about IRAC throughout the legal writing course, but 
only as a pre-writing tool.  We can thus reinforce the valuable schema that IRAC provides our 
students as they improve their ability to analyze legal problems without stifling their ability to move 
forward as legal writers—for example, from Technician to Drafter.  For a detailed discussion of how 
IRAC can fit into the pre-writing process, see infra Parts V–VI. 
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encouraging our students to continue to adhere to a superficial 
organizational structure when our goal is to help them move fairly 
quickly but confidently to more complex analysis and writing.143  Rather, 
as I argue in Part V,144 we should use IRAC as a pre-writing tool and 
draw on other methods of teaching written organization that better 
promote our students’ cognitive growth as members of the legal 
discourse community. 
IV. PRACTICAL DEFICIENCIES OF IRAC 
Perhaps the most concerning criticism of IRAC comes not from the 
legal academy, but from practitioners, who loudly call for better writing 
among new lawyers.145  Judges and senior lawyers complain that new 
lawyers are deficient in many areas of writing: conciseness, organization, 
analytical skills, precision, mechanics, and the list goes on.146  The fact 
that practitioners are criticizing graduates’ ability to organize their legal 
writing147 suggests that the model of strict adherence to IRAC taught in 
most first-year programs is not producing good practical results.148 
Even back in 1995, in the Second Draft issue devoted to IRAC, one 
former practitioner weighed in, expressing reservations about the “form-
fitted legal construct” of IRAC: 
[IRAC] . . . forces unprepared students to learn the hard way, at the 
expense of their clients, that practicing law involves understanding 
facts first, “what happened” and the “how” and “why” of the mess that 
brought the parties to the last resort of dispute resolution. Today’s 
lawyers have to understand the problem before they ever assist others 
in its practical resolution.  Consequently, for them to jump from issue 
                                                          
 143. Lustbader noted that even at the Drafter stage, some novice students “may spend most of 
their time and mental energy reminding themselves of the conventions of the discourse.”  Lustbader, 
supra note 128, at 343.  This suggests to me that overemphasizing IRAC for a prolonged period may 
drain our students of the mental energy they need to grow as legal analysts and writers.   
 144. See infra Part V. 
 145. See generally Legal Education and Professional Development—An Educational Continuum, 
Report of The Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992 A.B.A. 
Sec. of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar 1 (commonly known as The MacCrate Report); 
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 
(2007) (commonly known as The Carnegie Report); Amy Vorenberg & Margaret Sova McCabe, 
Practice Writing: Responding to the Needs of the Bench and Bar in First-Year Writing Programs, 2 
PHOENIX L. REV. 1 (2009); Kedia, supra note 41, at 148–49. 
 146. Vorenberg & McCabe, supra note 145, at 9–13. 
 147. Vorenberg & McCabe’s survey revealed that over half of the lawyers surveyed said that 
new law graduates’ writing was disorganized.  Id. at 9. 
 148. According to Vorenberg & McCabe, students reported that upon entering practice, they did 
“a lot of writing [but] were instructed to abandon the ‘IRAC’ model.”  Id. at 4–5.  
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to rule to application and conclusion is to fabricate a problem that fits 
the answer predetermined for them and set forth in the court’s 
decision.149 
This concern was quantified to some extent in 2009, when Amy 
Vorenberg and Margaret Sova McCabe surveyed a small sample of trial 
judges from several states to determine how current legal writing 
programs can better equip their students to meet the demands of 
practice.150  The judges who responded agreed that clear organization is a 
key quality of good legal writing, but they had reservations about the 
IRAC paradigm.151  When asked, “Do you find IRAC effective or do you 
prefer organization that combines rule explanation with application to 
client facts?” several judges stated a preference for the latter.152  They 
noted that “the use of an organizational paradigm that separates 
‘explanation’ from ‘application’ is not helpful where a particular legal 
issue is settled and frequently before the court.”153 And the judges noted 
that even when an issue is not settled, the “complexity and nature of the 
issue” should dictate the structure and depth of analysis, not a set 
paradigm.154 
Vorenberg and McCabe reported that “[m]ost of all, judges 
expressed a desire for writers to understand their task and vary their 
approach depending on the legal issue at hand.”155  They concluded that 
legal writing students need “greater training in tailoring their analytic 
approach to the legal issue.”156  As part of this training, “law-school 
writing classes should be less rigid about using IRAC or similar 
organizational paradigms.”157 
                                                          
 149. Manning Warren, IRAC Response, THE SECOND DRAFT (Legal Writing Inst., Tacoma, 
Wash.), Nov. 1995, at 19. 
 150. Vorenberg & McCabe, supra note 145, at 3–4. 
 151. Id. at 17. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. at 7.  Vorenberg and McCabe provided the judges with three briefs written by first-year 
law students.  Two of the briefs were organized using the IRAC paradigm (“explaining the law first 
and then applying the law to the facts”) and the other brief “allowed for greater organizational 
flexibility and often combined explanation of the law with application of client facts in the same 
paragraph.”  Id. at 14.  Overall, the judges ranked the brief that took the “integrated approach” 
higher than the briefs that followed IRAC.  Id. at 14–16.   
 155. Id. at 17–18. 
 156. Id. at 23. 
 157. Id.  “It is important that students do not learn that following IRAC or similar models 
automatically produces high-quality legal writing.”  Id. at 26.  Vorenberg and McCabe advocate 
“allow[ing] students more opportunities to practice” varied writing skills “depending on audience 
and subject matter” and “facilitat[ing] more discussion about what analytical content the legal reader 
needs and the best way to provide it.”  Id. at 23, 27; see also Rebekah Hanley, Becoming—or 
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[A]n inductive, problem-solving based method . . . recognizes the 
nuances of actual legal problems presented by actual clients—issues 
that are not easily resolved by finding the “correct” rule, but are more 
heavily dependent on an appropriate analysis of the facts, an 
application of the law to the facts, and a shaping of the resulting 
analysis toward achieving the client’s goals. . . . [T]his approach makes 
some aspects of legal reasoning and argument easier for students to 
absorb . . . [and] eliminat[es] the simplistic nature of the step-by-step 
IRAC approach, thus helping students to become legal analysts and 
problem solvers rather than mere legal technicians.158 
In sum, as Provenzano and Kagan observed, in law practice there is a 
“spectrum of acceptability” within which a writer’s work can fall.159  
While using IRAC might, in many situations, result in a memo or brief 
that is somewhere on that spectrum, it will not always result in the best 
or most acceptable product.160  We need to teach our students a better 
way to create a written product that will meet the needs and expectations 
of their readers—in terms of content, structure, style, and mechanics161—
once they enter the practice of law. 
V. A NEW APPROACH TO THE UTILITY OF IRAC 
The previous sections of this Article have laid out the various 
shortcomings of IRAC as a tool for teaching legal writing.  They have 
also emphasized the tension created by using a formula that at its best 
can convey only the simplest legal analysis, and thus must be presented 
very early in the first semester—the very time that we want our novice 
students to be building meaning for themselves. 
I believe that over the many years IRAC has been used in legal 
writing classes, legal writing professors have turned what was meant 
primarily as an analytic tool into a writing formula, to our students’ 
detriment.  In this part of the Article, I propose a return to IRAC as I 
                                                          
Hiring—A Capable Legal Writer: The Formula, 71 OR. BULL. 11, 11–12 (2011) (“expert legal 
writers do not strictly follow the organizational paradigms commonly taught to beginning legal 
writing students”).   
 158. Kedia, supra note 41, at 171–72. 
 159. Provenzano & Kagan, supra note 126, at 131. 
 160. See Kedia, supra note 41, at 150 (forcefully asserting that “[i]n essence, IRAC is nothing 
more than an imprecise organizational tool”).   
 161. See George Gopen, IRAC, REA, Where We Are Now, and Where We Should Be Going in the 
Teaching of Legal Writing, Keynote Address at the Capital Area Legal Writing Conference (Feb. 26, 
2011), available at http://www.journallegalwritinginstitute.org/archives/2011/17LegalWritingxvii-
xxxv.pdf  (arguing that rigid adherence to IRAC as a pedagogical approach prevents legal writing 
professors from teaching students how to persuasively construct sentences and paragraphs, which is 
the art of legal writing).  
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believe it was meant to function, and I offer some alternative, IRAC-free 
strategies for teaching our students how to organize their writing. 
A. Returning IRAC to Its Proper Place As a Starting Point for Pre-
Writing 
While no one seems to know the precise origin of the IRAC 
acronym,162 it likely did not originate as an organizational paradigm for 
legal writing.  More likely, it originated as a simple mnemonic for the 
basic steps of legal analysis: Begin with the question posed (Issue), 
identify the legal rules that govern that issue (Rule), apply those rules to 
the facts at hand (Application), and then decide what result most likely 
follows (Conclusion).163  Viewing IRAC in this way, no reasonable 
person would quarrel with its validity.  But this basic mnemonic for the 
steps of legal analysis will not get law students past the first week of law 
school; they need in-depth instruction on how to do legal analysis.164 
My own approach to teaching students how to analyze legal 
problems has changed significantly in the past several years; I have 
become increasingly deliberate about incorporating pre-writing into my 
first-semester legal writing course.  By pre-writing, I refer to the process 
that students should use to analyze a given legal writing assignment 
before they ever begin outlining a written document.  I spend the entire 
first month of the Fall semester exclusively on pre-writing, and I return 
to it throughout the year.  During the first month, I do not assign any 
                                                          
 162. See Kedia, supra note 41, at 152 (“Though many scholars reference IRAC in legal writing 
literature, there is no clear record of its genesis and underlying principles.”).  Richard Neumann is 
reported to have said that IRAC is “useful for exam-taking, but ineffective for memoranda and 
briefs.”  Nancy Soonpaa, The Continued Vitality of IRAC, THE SECOND DRAFT (Legal Writing Inst., 
Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 1995, at 15 (citing RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND 
LEGAL WRITING 231 (2d ed. 1994)).  This suggests that perhaps IRAC originated outside the legal 
writing context.  Kedia’s article supports this theory: “IRAC works well for exams, where fact 
patterns are provided, a set of defined legal issues are learned ahead of time, and a set of defined 
legal rules have been extracted from cases throughout the semester.”  Kedia, supra note 41, at 171. 
 163. See, e.g., Jo Anne Durako, Evolution of IRAC: A Useful First Step, THE SECOND DRAFT 
(Legal Writing Inst., Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 1995, at 6 (“I use IRAC during my second class meeting 
as an early introduction to one possible structure for analyzing a simple legal problem.” (emphasis 
added)).   
 164. Kedia, supra note 41, at 149 (“There are very few, if any, times in a lawyer’s education 
when someone takes the time to deliberately and systematically teach the student what legal analysis 
is, how to do it, and, most importantly, why it is necessary to help resolve a client’s problem.”).  
Kedia noted that “IRAC does not explicitly teach students to formulate legal analysis” and 
recommends that “professors should ensure that students understand the ways the law can be 
interpreted and applied before requiring them to physically write an analysis or even a simple rule 
explanation which could be based on a faulty or incomplete understanding of the legal sources they 
are using.”  Id. at 150–51, 172. 
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formal legal writing, so that students can practice and gain confidence in 
their analytical skills.  I rarely use the term “IRAC” when teaching pre-
writing strategies, although the teaching techniques I use do cover the 
four components of IRAC. 
For example, I give my students pre-writing worksheets for their first 
several assignments.  Here is the worksheet I use for a simplified 
burglary analysis: 
 
1. Read the e-mail to you from Regina Nance.165 
2. Make a bulleted list of the aspects of Mr. Jones’s166 story that 
seem important. 
3. Identify and write below the broad question Ms. Nance needs you 
to answer. 
4. Identify and write below any specific parameters of your 
assignment that will help you focus your work as you proceed. 
5. Read the North Carolina common-law burglary definition and the 
burglary statute that Ms. Nance has provided to you.  Highlight 
or circle the key elements. 
6. Of the elements you identified in your answer to Question 5, write 
below the ones that appear to be “givens” in Mr. Jones’s story 
and the facts that suggest that they are “givens.” 
7. Given the facts of Mr. Jones’s story as you now know them, and 
the elements of burglary you’ve identified, preliminarily identify 
the narrow issue you must analyze in order to answer the 
general question you identified in Question 3.  Write the 
preliminary narrow issue below. 
8. Read the Fields case once without taking any notes.  Write below 
any thoughts that occur to you about how the case might help 
address the preliminary narrow issue you identified in Question 
7. 
9. Now read the case again, closely and actively, taking notes in a 
format that is useful to you.  Note any new information you 
learn from the case that will assist you in analyzing the 
preliminary narrow issue you identified in Question 7. 
10. If your reading of the case has led you to a new understanding of 
the narrow issue you must analyze, write the revised narrow 
issue below. 
                                                          
 165. The hypothetical public defender in the jurisdiction in which the problem is set. 
 166. The hypothetical defendant who has been charged with first-degree burglary. 
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11. Identify the relevant categories of fact that seemed important to 
the result in the Fields case.  Create a visual representation of 
those categories, and include in your visual the key facts of the 
authorities and of Mr. Jones’s story, as they relate to those 
categories. 
12. Based on your visual representation, analyze Mr. Jones’s 
scenario and decide how the narrow issue you identified in 
Question 7 (or Question 10) would likely be resolved.  Be sure 
you consider all reasonable, possible outcomes.  Write below 
your decision and the key reasons for it. 
 
As the students work through these questions, they are thinking 
about each element of IRAC, but in a recursive way rather than in the 
linear way suggested by IRAC.  And the questions use the same 
terminology that I use in class—terminology that recognizes the 
complexity of legal analysis but helps demystify it. 
For example, questions 1–3 are designed to help students identify the 
broad question the scenario raises, and question 6 is an intermediate step 
that helps students focus their thinking; but it is not until question 7 that 
students are asked to articulate the narrow (deep) issue (the analog to the 
I of IRAC).  And question 10 recognizes that it may be necessary to 
revisit the initial formulation of the narrow issue after further reading and 
analysis.  These questions, viewed together, reinforce the basic truth that 
often, a lawyer must do considerable work just to arrive at the narrow 
legal question that his or her analysis must address. 
Likewise, questions 5 and 9 both relate to the rules (the R of IRAC) 
that govern the analysis.  Question 5 leads students to the general rules 
that govern the analysis, and then question 9 builds on that by requiring 
students to articulate the sub-rules from the authorities that help them 
understand and apply the general rules to the fact pattern.  And question 
11 requires students to organize (and perhaps even synthesize) the sub-
rules into a logical framework within which to place the facts of the 
problem.  This approach to the rules allows students to be “knowledge 
builders” rather than just “knowledge-tellers.” 
Questions 11 and 12 relate to the application and conclusion portions 
of the analysis (the A and the C of IRAC).  Question 11 reminds students 
that their analysis of how the rules apply to the facts must be grounded in 
the sub-rules they have identified.  And question 12 encourages students 
to remember the concept of counter-analysis.  Question 12 also helps 
students become comfortable with the ambiguity of the law by asking 
them to decide the likely outcome.  Finally, question 12 illustrates that 
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the conclusion of any legal analysis should be driven primarily by 
reason, not by emotion or intuition. 
After working through these questions, I quickly point out that what 
we have just done is consistent with the basic IRAC model for legal 
analysis that we discussed on Day One.  I think this point is an optional 
one; I make it just to allow my students to hear the term “IRAC” once 
again, so that if another law professor or a future employer refers to it, 
the students will understand the meaning of the term. 
B. Teaching Legal Writing Structure Without IRAC 
I recognize that the premise of this Article—that IRAC is helpful as 
a basic analytical tool but not as a paradigm for organizing legal 
writing—begs the question of what alternatives are available to teach 
students about organizing legal writing effectively.  I agree with Pollman 
and Stinson that “writing law . . . require[s] unambiguous precision” and 
that any terminology we might substitute for IRAC must serve that 
requirement.167  The key is “giving [our] students the tools needed to talk 
about writing in a sophisticated and meaningful way.”168  I think this can 
be done without the necessity of agreeing upon any one paradigm, using 
a variety of plain-language terms that will resonate and “stick” with our 
students. 
The following passage from a 2007 article on giving effective 
feedback on student writing provides a good example of this kind of 
plain-language term: 
One common target form in legal writing is the objective analytical 
memorandum that applies law to client facts to determine a likely 
answer to a legal question.  Legal memoranda have core legal 
reasoning components that appear in predictable “intellectual 
locations.”  In these intellectual locations, law-trained readers find rules 
of law, explanations of precedent, and applications of law to fact.169 
The concept of “intellectual location” would seem to be a natural starting 
point for teaching novices how to structure a memo. 
                                                          
 167. Pollman & Stinson, supra note 60, at 244. 
 168. Id. at 245. 
 169. Provenzano & Kagan, supra note 126, at 144 (emphasis added) (citing Mary Beth Beazley, 
The Self-Graded Draft: Teaching Students to Revise Using Guided Self-Critique, 3 LEGAL WRITING 
175, 177 (1997) (coining the term “intellectual locations”)).   
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First, it has the advantage of being reader-based.  Legal readers 
expect a lawyer’s analysis to incorporate “agreed-upon analytical 
elements”: 
[W]hen making a legal argument, it is expected that 1) the writer will 
articulate a rule for the court to apply, 2) the writer will cite to the best 
possible authority for that rule, 3) the writer will explain any 
ambiguities in the rule, usually by illustrating how the rule has been 
applied in the past, and 4) the writer will explain how the rule should be 
applied in the pending action.170 
The legal writing professor can then illustrate that in most situations, 
putting the elements in this order meets the intellectual expectations of 
the reader.  This can be done easily without continually mentioning the 
IRAC “formula.” 
A second advantage of the concept of “intellectual location” is that it 
allows students to begin to construct their own schemata for 
communicating legal analysis by allowing them to think for themselves 
about the best “intellectual location” for any given analytical component. 
For the same reasons that “intellectual location” would work, 
“intellectual weight” would work as a companion term, to help students 
understand that the level of detail they need to include about the 
analytical elements will vary from memo to memo, depending on the 
type of analysis required.  Where an analysis requires students to 
analogize and distinguish precedential cases to their own case facts, the 
reader expects the explanation of the rule to be relatively “heavy.”  In 
contrast, where an analysis requires students to use rule-based reasoning 
instead of analogical reasoning, the reader might expect the explanation 
of the rule (the description of the precedential case’s key facts, holding, 
and reasoning) to be quite “light.”  And where an analysis requires 
students to discuss policy, the explanation of the rule might be “heavier” 
with regard to the holding and reasoning but “lighter” as to the key facts 
of the case that articulates the rule. 
Professors can effectively use sample memoranda to illustrate the 
concepts of “intellectual location” and “intellectual weight.”  Instead of 
using the samples to point out IRAC structure (here is the I, here is the R, 
here is the explanation of the R, here is the A, here is the C), they can 
discuss with their students why the writers placed certain information in 
certain “intellectual locations” and what “intellectual weight” the writers 
placed on that information and why. 
                                                          
 170. Beazley, supra note 169, at 178. 
2015] WHY-RAC? 711 
These two terms can be used in conjunction with any number of 
other terms that legal writing professors have coined to teach structure.  
For example, the term “deep issue”171 can be used to describe the narrow 
legal question the memo answers, as distinguished from the broad 
question the hypothetical “senior partner” may have posed.  The term 
“roadmap” or “landscape” can be used to describe the introductory 
portion of the analysis in which the writer leads the reader from that 
broad question to the “deep issue.”172  The term “broad governing rule” 
can be used to describe a statute or a common law test that governs the 
broad question, and the term “sub-rules” can be used to describe the 
narrower rules that illustrate how the broad governing rule operates.  Our 
legal writing texts are replete with good terminology that we can use 
consistently to describe the various components of a written analysis.173 
This approach is fully consistent with the conclusion reached by 
Tracy Turner in her 2012 examination of the current role of IRAC in 
legal writing.174  In her article, Turner hoped to “liberate the core 
principles of effective organization from acronyms so that lawyers can 
talk to one another about organization without debating the merits of a 
particular method they learned in law school or from their first mentors 
in the profession.”175  To that end, Turner reviewed the then-current 
editions of every available textbook on legal writing published or 
republished in the ten prior years and a large number of articles 
addressing IRAC and other related acronyms, seeking to answer five 
questions:176 
1. If the text uses an acronym (e.g., IRAC, CRAC, CREAC, etc.), what 
is it and how does the author describe each component?  If not, 
summarize the lessons the text offers regarding organization. 
2. How does the author justify the acronym or organization the book 
discusses? 
                                                          
 171. BRYAN GARNER, THE WINNING BRIEF 49 (1996). 
 172. If a pre-writing worksheet such as the one reproduced above is used for an assignment, we 
can conveniently note that all of the information generated when answering questions 1–7 belongs in 
the landscape or roadmap paragraphs.  
 173. But see Terrill Pollman, Building a Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking About 
Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887, 889 (2002) (noting that legal writing professors “have not yet 
established a uniform common vocabulary within the legal writing academy”). 
 174. Turner, supra note 66, at 356–60. 
 175. Id. at 354. 
 176. Id. (Turner reviewed all the books “available in [her] school’s law library or on [her] 
bookshelves”). 
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3. Does the author address single v. multiple IRACS? Summarize the 
lessons offered. 
4. Does the text discuss topic sentences?  Summarize the lessons 
offered. . . . 
5. Does the text discuss a need to complete discussion of the law 
before applying the law to the facts?177 
Turner concluded that among legal writing professionals there is 
“broad consensus” on four core principles of effective organization in 
legal documents, the first of which is rule-centered analysis.178  She 
noted that “the quest to capture some of the complexity of legal analysis 
has led to an explosion of alternative acronyms”179 which may have had 
the undesired effect of “obscur[ing] the main point of IRAC: legal 
analysis must begin with the law as its starting point.”180  She also noted 
that students must grapple with the pieces of the broad rule and how the 
sub-rules relate to the broad rule in order to determine both the 
“intellectual location” and the “intellectual weight” of the various pieces 
of the analysis—in other words, to organize the analysis effectively for 
the reader.181 
Teaching students (1) to use IRAC as a basic pre-writing tool and (2) 
to organize their written analysis using a rule-based approach (describing 
that approach using the terms suggested above) would alleviate many of 
the concerns about the use of IRAC described in Parts II-IV of this 
Article. 
First, it would allow students the freedom to wrestle with the various 
components of legal analysis in a more meaningful way.  Take the I, for 
example.  Of course, every legal analysis begins with an Issue—a 
question that the analyst must answer.  That is as far as we need to go 
with the I of IRAC.  Then, as a pre-writing matter, we should teach our 
students to recognize that in all but the simplest legal analysis, there is at 
least one broad issue (is your client likely to be convicted of first-degree 
                                                          
 177. Id. at 354–55. 
 178. Id. at 355. 
 179. Id. at 357.  See generally supra Part II.C. (reviewing many of these acronyms). 
 180. Turner, supra note 66, at 357. 
 181. In her 2010 article, Soma Kedia advocates an even softer approach to thinking about and 
communicating legal analysis, which she calls “outcome-oriented” rather than “rule-oriented.”  
Kedia, supra note 41, at 151.  “Rather than understanding legal writing as technical, rule-oriented 
analysis, I aim to think of legal writing simply as writing in the context of a system bound by rules 
of law—as outcome-oriented rather than rule-oriented—while still focusing on teaching students the 
distinguishing features of writing as a lawyer.”  Id. 
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burglary?) and one or more narrow (deep) issues (was the structure he 
broke into a dwelling?). 
Even when students are ready to begin drafting the written analysis, 
there is no need to revert to mentioning IRAC.  We can say, “In terms of 
intellectual location, your discussion needs to start with the broad 
question first, and then you need to lead your reader to the deep issue by 
way of a solid roadmap paragraph.” 
A similar approach to the R works well.  At the pre-writing stage, we 
should teach our students simply that to answer the deep issue—and 
sometimes to identify it—they must find (or construct) and understand 
the applicable rules from the relevant authorities.  There are broad rules 
(the elements of first-degree burglary, for example) and more specific 
sub-rules that clarify, expand on, limit, or state exceptions to the broad 
rules (the sub-rules regarding what constitutes a dwelling, for 
example).182  And both the broad rules and the sub-rules may be explicit, 
or they may have to be synthesized. 
When the students are ready to begin writing about the rule, we can 
still instruct them without reference to IRAC.  We might say, for 
example, that the level of detail in the case illustrations will vary 
according to the “intellectual weight” of the rule the case illustrates:  
The broad rule in your roadmap stating the elements of burglary isn’t 
very intellectually weighty, so the case you’re citing for that rule 
doesn’t need heavy explanation.  There’s no need to go into the key 
facts, holding, and reasoning of that case.  But the sub-rule about what 
makes a structure a dwelling carries a lot of intellectual weight.  It 
gives you the factors that form the basis of your analysis, and it shows 
how those factors have been applied in previous cases.  So the cases 
you’re citing there need more explanation; you need to spend 
considerably more time on their key facts, holdings, and reasoning. 
Moving to the A, we should emphasize at the pre-writing stage that 
the application part of the analytical process is rarely a simple matter of 
matching up facts in a mechanical way; effective application requires 
careful reasoning (often by analogy but sometimes also using policy) and 
                                                          
 182. See Blumenfeld, supra note 12, at 3 (recognizing the need to instruct students that a rule 
segment “consists of two pieces: a general rule usually derived from a statute or caselaw, and cases 
that explain that rule and illustrate how it has been applied to specific fact situations in the past”).  
Blumenfeld’s suggested acronym replaces the R of IRAC with G (general rule) and P (precedent).  
Id.  My point in this Article is that there is no need to create some new acronym reflecting the 
relationship between broad rules and sub-rules; we can simply say, “First, articulate the broad rule, 
then explain it by discussing the sub-rules from the cases, giving the explanation whatever 
intellectual weight it merits.”  
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careful consideration of possible analyses and counter-analyses.  We 
need to give our students helpful, concrete strategies for moving through 
the application stage of the analysis, and we need to help them become 
comfortable with the uncertainty of the outcome.183 
When students move to writing about the application, we still need 
not revert to discussing IRAC.  We can simply teach them how to 
construct the application logically, using the terms suggested above or 
other helpful terms:  
Here, you want to arrange your application so that you first tell your 
reader the factual similarities and distinctions that drive the result you 
think is most likely, being sure to explain their legal significance.  
Then, you want to alert the reader to any reasonable counter-analysis, 
giving it as much intellectual weight as it merits.  If there are policy 
considerations, you need to think about the best intellectual location for 
those.184 
And, to recognize the role of storytelling, we might add, “And in the end, 
you need to consider how well your application weaves in the elements 
of story that will resonate so deeply with your reader.” 
Second, this approach to IRAC (using it as a basic description of 
legal analysis instead of a formula for organizing legal writing) would 
eliminate the need to come up with different and ever-more-complex 
variations on the IRAC acronym to account for the structural 
complexities of legal analysis.  On any given assignment, students would 
be able to construct their own “best” organization, within the parameters 
of applicable rules, using the “intellectual location” concept. 
In all of the above examples relating to the writing portion of a first-
degree burglary problem, the hypothetical professor is touching on each 
element of IRAC and is emphasizing principles of effective organization.  
But the language used makes it more likely that students will practice 
independent thinking as they outline and draft the discussion.  Students 
will be constructing their own schemata for assessing how to best 
arrange the pieces of each analysis, rather than trying to fit the pieces of 
every analysis into one rigid IRAC (or CRuPAC or IGPAC or 
RAFADC) mold.  Their writing will be less “knowledge-telling” and 
more “knowledge-creating.” 
                                                          
 183. See GRAHAM & FELSENBURG, supra note 34, at 111–13. 
 184. This would help eliminate the rote application sections we often see (especially among 
novice legal writers)— “Like fact A, fact A1.  And like fact B, fact B1.  But unlike fact C, fact C1.  
Because there are more likes than unlikes, the result here is the same as the result in the precedential 
case.”   
2015] WHY-RAC? 715 
Finally, this approach to IRAC would give legal writing professors 
the flexibility to use more varied assignments throughout the year.  For 
example, with adequate time for pre-writing, we could assign first-
semester law students a memo that allows them to explore how policy 
arguments fit in to an objective analysis (instead of waiting until the 
second semester, or even the second year, to introduce policy 
arguments).  We could more easily replace the traditional office memo 
discussion, which is perhaps more IRAC-compatible, with a client letter, 
or an email assignment, or other kinds of legal communications that do 
not rely on a rigid IRAC structure.185  In this way, we would be 
addressing some of the concerns expressed by practitioners about new 
lawyers’ rote reliance on IRAC. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The firm entrenchment of IRAC in legal writing pedagogy suggests 
that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to completely replace it with 
another paradigm or teaching method.  And I do not advocate that IRAC 
should be forever banished from the legal writing classroom.  My Article 
is intended to advance the conversation about IRAC’s utility as a tool for 
teaching the how-tos of legal writing and to suggest some strategies for 
those professors who wish to “pull back” from rigid reliance on it.  By 
drawing on IRAC’s strength as a basic analytical framework for legal 
analysis and teaching students helpful pre-writing strategies they can 
deliberately employ when conducting legal analysis, we can move them 
more comfortably into the writing stage, giving them maximum 
flexibility to create products that work for their legal readers. 
 
                                                          
 185. See generally Katie Rose Guest Pryal, The Genre Discovery Approach: Preparing Law 
Students to Write Any Legal Document, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 351 (2013) (arguing that first-year legal 
writing courses should teach students how to approach new “genres” of legal writing beyond 
traditional office memos and other standard documents).  I believe that focusing less on IRAC as a 
writing tool will make it easier for our students to transfer skills from one legal document genre to 
another. 
